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ABSTRACT 
 
An extensive literature demonstrates a relationship between gender and corruption, with women be-
ing less involved in corrupt transactions than men. There are two major ways of explaining this cor-
relation; one emphasizes differences between men and women in risk-aversion and the other differ-
ences in pro-social behavior. However, whether there is support for these explanations is never di-
rectly tested. We take advantage of one opportunity for gathering this evidence by replicating and 
extending a well-cited experimental study by Alatas et al. (2009). Through our extension of the Alatas 
et al. study, we were able to collect unique information on gender differences in rationalizations of 
experimental subjects’ behavior. The key finding is that we see significant gender differences in rea-
sons for behavior: the results indicate risk-seeking behavior among men but not risk aversion among 
women. Instead, pro-social reasoning is apparent among women.   
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Introduction 
Previous research suggests that there is a link between gender and corruption; with women being less 
involved in corrupt transactions than men (Bauhr et al. 2018; Brollo and Troiano 2016; Dollar et al. 
2001; Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2018; Swamy et al. 2001; Fišar et al. 2016; 
Stensöta and Wängenrud ed. 2018). Since the link between gender and corruption is rather persistent, 
scholars are currently more inclined to discuss why the pattern exists as opposed to whether it exists 
at all. On this front, two explanations predominate the literature for understanding why women are 
less corrupt than men. The first type of explanation focuses on differences between men and women 
in risk-aversion. Scholars following this line of reasoning emphasize that women are punished harder 
than men for norm-breaking behavior and thus, in settings where there is a strong norm against 
corruption women refrain from such behavior (Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 
2018). The second type of explanation focuses on differences in gender role socialization (Dollar et 
al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001). Scholars following this line of reasoning emphasize that processes so-
cializing girls to be more other regarding and caring compared to boys predisposes women to support 
and engage in more pro-social behavior, which lessens their tendency to engage in corruption.  
Scholars tend to invoke these explanations to explain correlations between gender and cor-
ruption, when finding, for instance, that women are less likely to consider bribery justifiable in cross-
national public opinion surveys (Torgler and Valev 2010), or to explain correlations between female 
inclusion and levels of corruption across societal units (e.g., women’s presence in national legislatures 
and countries’ levels of corruption (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2018)). However, whether there is 
support for these explanations is never directly tested. For instance, these studies do not ask women 
why they think bribery is unjustifiable and they do not ask female politicians why they are averse to 
corruption,  
We take advantage of one opportunity for gathering evidence on why individuals react the 
way that they do when faced with a corruption scenario. We do this by replicating and extending a 
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well-cited experimental study by Alatas et al. (2009). Through our extension of the Alatas et al. study, 
we were able to collect unique information on gender differences in rationalizations of experimental 
subjects’ behavior. Alatas et al. investigate gender differences in a bribery game. In the game, three 
persons are confronted with a common bribery problem in which they assume roles as players. The 
roles assigned to the players are a manager of a firm, a government official and a citizen. Then, 
through a series of moves, players must decide whether to bribe.  
We replicate Alatas et al.’s study with experiments in Germany and the United States and 
extend the research by asking for player rationalizations of how they played the game. Through this 
extension of the research, we gain insights into how respondents themselves explained their behavior 
with data from a questionnaire asking them to reflect on how they played the game. With this new 
data, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to evaluate gender differences in behavior ration-
alization in corruption scenarios, which contributes to our understanding of the proposed mecha-
nisms in the literature on gender and corruption.  
 
Hypotheses 
As we have noted a rather extensive literature demonstrates that women are more averse to corrup-
tion compared to men. The experiments on which our study builds were conducted in Germany and 
the United States, two advanced democracies1, thus, we hypothesize that women, in the bribery game, 
should refrain from corrupt behavior to a higher degree than men (H1).  
We perceive risk-aversion as the explanation currently gaining the most attention for those 
assumed differences. An important backdrop for this emphasis is the rather extensive experimental 
                                                     
1 Research finds that this is especially likely to impact levels of corruption in democracies (Esarey and Chirillo 2013). 
Similarly, in their experimental work, Alatas et al. also found a gender effect in playing the bribery game in a democratic 
context.  
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research in the area of financial risks. For instance, Byrnes et al. (1999) reviewed 150 studies, exam-
ining differences in risk-taking between men and women and demonstrated that women, on average, 
take fewer risks than men (see also Charness and Gneezy 2012; Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998). 
Thus, we hypothesize that risks, fear of sanctions, and similar reasons will be more apparent in explanations 
brought forward by women than men in the experimental bribery game (H2). 
Another strand of research, however, proposes a greater female propensity towards pro-
social behavior as the explanation for gender differences. In social psychology, prosocial behavior 
was traditionally captured by whether bystanders interfere in situations concerning unknown others. 
More recently, the perspective has started to include a variety of behaviors, to the benefit of unknown 
others and/or collective groups (Dovidio et al. 2006). For instance, a recent experimental study on 
tax compliance (D’Attoma et al. 2018) in the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Italy 
lends some support to the pro-social explanation: in all countries women are significantly more com-
pliant than men but there is little evidence of this being triggered by attitudes towards risks. In line 
with these assumptions and findings, we hypothesize that pro-social behavior, care of unknown others, will 
be more apparent in explanations brought forward by women than men in the experimental bribery game (H3). 
 
The bribery game 
Similar to the experiment of Alatas et al. (2009) we conducted a laboratory experiment, including 712 
students (308 males (43%) and 404 women (57%)), designed as a sequential-move game. In the ex-
periment, three persons are confronted with a common bribery problem in which they assume roles 
as players. The roles assigned to the players are a manager of a firm, a government official and a 
citizen whom start, respectively, with a fictitious endowment of 30, 60, and 80 experimental dollars. 
Then, through a series of moves, players must decide whether to bribe. The firms and public officials 
know that they face sanctions from the citizens if they engage in corruption and can calculate the 
consequences based on the decision tree. Figure 1 contains an extensive-form representation of the 
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game where all of the payoffs are denoted in experimental dollars (see appendix for more infor-
mation). 
 
FIGURE 1, THE GAME TREE 
 
1. The firm player moves first and must decide whether to offer a bribe to the government official 
player to avoid complying with an environmental regulation (in order to increase its own payoff at 
the expense of society), and if so, how much to offer. The player can choose a bribe amount B ∈. It 
costs the firm two experimental dollars to offer the money and the firm incurs this transaction cost 
regardless of whether the bribe is accepted.  
2. If the bribe is offered, the official can either accept or reject it. Acceptance of the bribe implies 
favorable treatment of the firm. It increases the payoffs of both the firm and the official by 3B, but 
decreases the payoff of the citizen by 7B. Bribery has a significant impact on society. This is captured 
by the large decrease in the citizen’s payoff. The payoff increases the likelihood that the firm benefits 
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from avoiding environmental regulation. The official’s payoff also increases by 3B even though the 
amount of bribe paid by the firm is B. This is due to a difference in the marginal utility of income. 
Since the income earned in the public sector is likely to be lower than that earned in the private sector, 
the same amount of money can be assumed to have a lower marginal utility value to the firm than to 
the official.  
3. The third player is called the citizen and moves last after observing the choices made by the firm 
and the official. The citizen observes the decisions made by the firm and the official and can punish 
them for the act of bribery by choosing an amount P ∈ in penalty. Punishment is costly to the citizen 
and reduces the citizen’s payoff by the amount of the punishment, P. However, it imposes a monetary 
sanction on the firm and official by reducing their payoffs by 3P. Hence, the net benefit to the firm 
and the official from the corrupt transaction is 3B −2 −3P and 3B −3P respectively.  
According to their role, we survey players after the game to gather data on their reasons for 
their behavior. They are allowed to choose several answers from a list but they can also add reasons 
in an open-ended “other” option (survey included in the appendix). The reasons presented to players 
vary according to whether individuals choose to bribe or to abstain and whether they play the roles 
as firm, official or citizen. In the following analysis, we begin by analyzing gender differences in 
bribing, accepting a bribe and punishment for accepting a bribe and then move on to analyzing gen-
der differences in reasons given for behavior.  
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Results 
The appendix includes several tests such as t-tests and (logistic) regression analyses with controls.2 
Here we will report the main findings of our experiment in comparison to the results for Australia in 
the Alatas et al. (2009) study. Table 1 shows gender differences in bribing, accepting and punishing. 
 
TABLE 1, GENDER DIFFERENCES IN BRIBING, ACCEPTING AND PUNISHING 
A. Australia Alatas et al 2009 study 
 Male Female p-value 
% firms bribing 91.59 80.37 0.02 
% officials accepting 92.13 80.00 0.02 
% citizens punishing 49.15 62.63 0.10 
    
B. Germany and United States current study 
 Male Female p-value 
% firms bribing 64.71 52.31 0.06 
% officials accepting 52.46 57.53 0.55 
% citizens punishing 57.14 59.26 0.86 
Comment: See text and online appendix for information on the current study. 
 
       
                                                     
2 We have run certain t-tests such as two-group mean-comparison test (two-sample t test with equal variances) as well 
as (logistic) regression analyses including religion, field of study, work experience, time spent in other countries, corruption 
experience, the wish to work in the private or public sector and nationality (see online appendix). 
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TWO-GROUP MEAN-COMPARI-
SON TEST: TWO-SAMPLE T 
TEST WITH EQUAL VARIANCES 
 
a) BRIBE AS FIRM 
 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]  
Male 85 0.647 0.052 0.480 0.543 0.750  
Female 151 0.523 0.040 0.501 0.442 0.603  
combined 236 0.567 0.032 0.496 0.504 0.631  
diff   0.123 0.066   -0.008 0.255  
                    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                                       t = 1.849  
                    Ho: diff = 0                                                                            degrees of freedom =      234  
                    Ha: diff < 0                           Ha: diff ! = 0                            Ha: diff > 0  
      Pr(T  <  t) = 0.967                              Pr(|T| > |t|) =  0.065                  Pr(T > t) = 0.032  
       
b) ACCEPTANCE AS OFFICAL 
     
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Male 61 0.524 0.064 0.503 0.395 0.653 
Female 73 0.575 0.058 0.497 0.459 0.691 
combined 134 0.552 0.043 0.499 0.466 0.637 
diff   -0.050 0.086   -0.222 0.120 
           diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                                              t = -0.584 
           Ho: diff = 0                                                                                   degrees of freedom =       132 
           Ha: diff < 0                                    Ha: diff ! = 0                          Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T  <  t) = 0.279                                     Pr(|T| > |t|) =  0.559               Pr(T > t) = 0.720 
Continued, next page 
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c) PUNISHMENT AS CITIZEN 
     
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Male 21 0.571 0.110 0.507 0.340 0.802 
Female 54 0.592 0.067 0.495 0.457 0.727 
combined 75 0.586 0.057 0.495 0.472 0.700 
Diff   -0.021 0.128   -0.276 0.234 
            diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                                               t = -0.164 
            Ho: diff = 0                                                                                    degrees of freedom =         73 
            Ha: diff < 0                                    Ha: diff ! = 0                           Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T  <  t) = 0.434                                   Pr(|T| > |t|) =  0.869               Pr(T > t) = 0.565 
 
The results in Table 1 lend some support to the Alatas et al. conclusion that men have a higher 
propensity to bribe than women: in the role as firm, 64.71 % of the men, compared to 52.32 % of 
women offered a bribe and this result holds in regression analyses (Table A1 in online appendix). 
However, neither in the role as the official or as the citizen do we observe significant gender differ-
ences. Thus, H1, that women, in the bribery game, should refrain from corrupt behavior to a higher degree than men, 
can only partially be confirmed. 
 
Reasons for behavior 
We are not aware of any previous experimental study in the area of corruption research where anal-
yses of men’s versus women’s way of rationalizing their behavior have been conducted. Table 2 re-
ports gender differences in reasons for behavior in the different phases of the bribery game.3 Reasons 
that are more apparent among women than men are “morality” (phase 1 not offering a bribe, phase 
3 reasons for punishing), “to reduce corruption” (phase 1 not offering a bribe, phase 2 reasons for 
                                                     
3 It should be noted that the context of our study was neutral in the way that the material handed out to students said 
nothing about gender. Thus we can assume that effects of gender on reason for behavior indicate attitudinal differences 
with some validity (even though results should be interpreted with some care since comparatively few respondents gave 
reasons for their behavior). 
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rejecting the bribe), “fairness” (phase 3 punishing) and “bribe may be for a good purpose” (phase 3 
not punishing). These reasons can be interpreted as pro-social behavior. Reasons that are more ap-
parent among men are “profit/pay-off maximization” (phase 1 offering bribe, phase 2 accepting the 
bribe, phase 3 not punishing), “salaries are low” (phase 2 accepting bribe) and “bribe too small” 
(phase 2 rejecting the bribe). Profit/pay-off maximization can be interpreted as risk-seeking behavior 
whereas salaries are low and bribe to small can be interpreted as self-regarding behavior. Compared 
to other themes, risk-aversion and fear is seldom mentioned. In one phase (phase 1 not offering a 
bribe) women give answers in line with a risk-aversion perspective, choosing to answer “risk-aver-
sion/fear of sanctions/consequences/laws” but percentages are low (7%) and men also give such 
answers in phase 2 (rejecting the bribe), choosing to answer “scared of implications/risk” to almost 
the same extent as women (32% and 34% respectively). Thus,  H2, that risks, fear of sanctions, and similar 
themes will be more apparent in explanations brought forward by women than men can be rejected and, H3, that 
pro-social behavior, care of unknown others, will be more apparent in explanations brought forward by women than 
men confirmed. Interestingly enough, these results indicate that men may be more risk-seeking than 
women but this is not necessarily the same thing as saying that women thereby can be regarded as 
more risk-averse. 
As with any other method, experimental approaches have some limitations such as the ex-
ternal validity of the findings. We are fully aware of the methodological problems involved identifying 
the precise micro-level mechanism in an experimental setting of this type. However, compared to 
other approaches investigating the complex corruption-gender link, we argue that our analysis pro-
vides a somewhat more precise account of the underlying dynamics then so far attempted in the 
literature. We recommend that future studies should replicate our study to explore the gender-cor-
ruption link in different samples, contexts and settings.   
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TABLE 2, GENDER DIFFERENCES IN REASONS FOR BEHAVIOR  
 Male Female Difference 
Phase 1 reasons for offering the bribe    
To see the response of the official/citizen 35%   59%  -24 
Payoff maximation 50%  36%  +14  
For the good of the country (e.g. reduce unemployment) 14%  8%  +6 
Total number answering 66 88  
Phase 1 reasons for not offering the bribe    
Morality 36% 65% -29 
To reduce corruption (social cost) 18% 47% -29 
Profit-maximization (in long run bad for the firm) 32% 20% +12 
Risk aversion/fear of sanctions/consequences/laws - 7% -7 
To protect the environment/environmental reasons 2% 5% -3 
Not necessary for firms to bribe 11% 12% -1 
Equity 9% 9% - 
Total number answering 44 87    
Phase 2 reasons for accepting the bribe    
Necessary because salaries are low 28% 13% +15 
Payoff maximation 55% 42% +13 
Game will continue 41% 47% -6 
Necessary for firms/help the firm 17% 13% +4 
Equity 7% 5% +2 
Total number answering 29 38  
Phase 2 reasons for rejecting the bribe    
Bribe too small 28% 13% +15 
To reduce corruption (social cost) 41% 52% -11 
Payoff maximation 10% 16% -6 
Scared of implications/risk 34% 32% +2 
Fairness 31% 29% +2 
Morality 55% 55% - 
Total number answering 29 31  
Phase 3 reasons for punishing    
Morality 58% 78% -20 
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Fairness 42% 59% -17 
Negative reciprocity 25% 19% +6 
Reduce corruption 67% 66% +1 
Total number answering 12 32  
Phase 3 reasons for not punishing    
Payoff maximation 100% 71% +29 
Bribe may be for good purpose or necessary - 19% -19 
Difficult to change the system 12% 29% -17 
Ineffective punishment system 38% 24% +14 
Total number answering 8 21  
Comment: See text and online appendix for information on the study. 
 
Conclusion 
Our finding that the Alatas et al. (2009) results could only partially be confirmed should not be taken 
as an indicator that gender plays a limited role in relation to corruption. Most contemporary studies 
discuss effects on levels of corruption from female representation in elected arenas such as parlia-
ments and local councils. The important contribution of our study is that we found little evidence of 
risk-aversion among women as an explanation for their differences in behavior compared to men. 
Our results underpin the notion that forthcoming studies should delve deeper into the role of pro-
social versus self-regarding behavior in analyzes of effects of gender on corruption.  
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APPENDIX 
The framing of the experiment had nothing to do with gender but the question guiding the initial 
research was “What affects an individual’s propensity to engage in and punish corrupt actions?” and 
the aim was to get at the effects of culture through a comparison between individuals in the United 
States and Germany. The data, consisting of bribery games with over 700 students, can however be 
analyzed from a gender perspective. In the first section of the appendix we report the raw figures and 
in the second section results of regression analysis. The survey is included at the end of the appendix. 
 
Section I  
 
TABLE 1A, PERCENTAGES OFFERING A BRIBE 
 Bribed as a Firm Total 
 Yes No  
Men 55 
(64.71%) 
30 
(35.29%) 
85 
(100%) 
Women 79 
(52.32%) 
72 
(47.68%) 
151 
(100%) 
Total 134 
(56.78%) 
102 
(43.22%) 
236 
(100%) 
 
TABLE 1B, REASONS FOR OFFERING THE BRIBE (FIRM) 
 Women Men 
Payoff Maximation 32 33 
For the Social / Economic Good of the Country (e.g. reduce unemployment etc.)  7 9 
To see the response of the official / citizen  52 23 
Total 88 66 
Note: Respondents could give several answers 
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TABLE 1C, REASONS FOR NOT OFFERING THE BRIBE (FIRM) 
 Women Men 
Morality  57 16 
To reduce corruption (social cost) 41 8 
Profit-Maximisation (in the long run it is bad for the firm) 17 12 
Not necessary for firms to bribe 10 5 
Equity 8 4 
Risk aversion/ Fear of Sanctions/Consequences/Laws 6 - 
To protect the environment / environmental reasons 4 1 
Total 87 44 
Respondents could give several answers 
 
TABLE 2A, PERCENTAGES ACCEPTING A BRIBE 
 Accepted as Official Total 
 Yes No  
Men 32 
(52.46%) 
29 
(47.54%) 
61  
(100%) 
Women 42  
(57.53%) 
31 
(42.47%) 
73  
(100%) 
Total 74 
(55.22%) 
60 
(44.78%) 
134  
(100%) 
 
TABLE 2B, REASONS FOR ACCEPTING THE BRIBE 
 Women Men 
Necessary for firms to bribe / will be able to help the firm  5 5 
Necessary because salaries are low 5 8 
Payoff Maximation 16 16 
Equity 2 2 
Game will continue 18 12 
Total 38 29 
 
TABLE 2C, REASONS FOR REJECTING THE BRIBE 
 Women Men 
   
Morality 17 16 
To reduce corruption (social cost) 16 12 
Scared of implications / risk 10 10 
Payoff Maximisation 5 3 
Fairness 9 9 
Bribe too small 4 8 
Total 31 29 
Respondents could give several answers 
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TABLE 3A, PERCENTAGES PUNISHING AS CITIZENS 
 Punished as a Citi-
zen 
Total 
   
 Yes No  
Men 12 
(57.14%) 
9 
(42.86%) 
21  
(100%) 
Women 32 
(59.26%) 
22 
(40.74%) 
54  
(100%) 
Total 44 
(58.67%) 
31 
(41.33%) 
75 
(100%) 
 
TABLE 3B, REASONS FOR PUNISHING (CITIZENS) 
 Women Men 
Morality 25 7 
Reduce corruption 21 8 
Fairness 19 5 
Negative Reciprocity 6 3 
Total 32 12 
Respondents could give several answers 
 
TABLE 3C, REASONS FOR NOT PUNISHING (CITIZENS) 
 Women Men 
Payoff Maximisation    15 8 
Difficult to change the system 6 1 
Ineffective punishment system 5 3 
Bribe may be for a good purpose or may be necessary 4 - 
Total 21 8 
Respondents could give several answers 
 
NUMBER OF JUSTIFICATIONS / REASONS (OVERALL SAMPLE) FOR EACH ROLE 
Bribed 
women gave 109 reasons; 79 bribed (109/79)= 1,37 reasons 
men gave 73 reasons; 55 bribed (73/55) = 1,32 reasons 
  
Did not bribe 
women gave 136 reasons for non-bribery; 72 didn't bribe = 1,88 reasons  
men gave 48 reasons for non-bribery; 30 did not bribe = 1,6 reasons 
 
 
Acceptance of bribe 
women gave 47 reasons; 42 accepted (47/42)= 1,19 reasons 
men gave 45 reasons; 32 accepted (45/32)= 1,40 reasons 
 
Non-Acceptance of bribe  
*women gave 66 reasons; 31 did not accepted (66/31)= 2,12 reasons 
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*men gave 67 reasons; 29 did not accepted (67/29)= 2,31 reasons 
  
Punish 
* women gave 75 reasons; 32 punished (75/32) = 2.34 
* men gave 26 reasons; 12 punished (26/12) = 2.16 
 
No Punishing 
* women gave 31 reasons for not punishing; 22 did not punish (31/22) = 1.4 
* men gave 12 reasons; 9 did not punish (12/9) = 1.33 
 
 
Section II: Regressions 
 
TABLE A1, BRIBED AS A FIRM:  TOTAL SAMPLE 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Bribed as a Firm 
(1)  
Gender -0.634* 
(0.328) 
 
Religion -0.026 
(0.053) 
 
Field of Study -0.013 
(0.018) 
 
Work Experience -0.837** 
(0.363) 
 
Time spent in other countries 0.009* 
(0.005) 
 
Corruption Experience 0.431 
(0.431) 
 
Wish to work in private or public sector 0.054 
(0.190) 
 
Nationality 
California = 1; Germany=0 
0.747** 
(0.351) 
 
Constant 0.065 
(0.727) 
 
Observations 206  
Pseudo R2 0.0791  
Prob > chi2 0.0043  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE A2, AMOUNT OF BRIBE: TOTAL SAMPLE 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Amount of Bribe 
(1)  
Gender -1.544*** 
(0.404) 
 
Religion -0.043 
(0.064) 
 
Field of Study -0.001 
(0.024) 
 
Work Experience 0.619 
(0.394) 
 
Time spent in other countries 0.001 
(0.003) 
 
Corruption Experience 0.210 
(0.496) 
 
Wish to work in private or public sector 0.367 
(0.231) 
 
Nationality -0.130 
(0.439) 
 
Constant 6.276*** 
(0.880) 
 
Observations 111  
Prob > F    0.029  
R-squared 0.150  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
TABLE A3, ACCEPTANCE OF BRIBE: TOTAL SAMPLE 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Acceptance of Bribe 
 
Gender -0.326 
(0.437) 
 
Religion 0.067 
(0.075) 
 
Field of Study -0.011 
(0.020) 
 
Work Experience 0.470 
(0.460) 
 
Time spent in other countries -0.001 
(0.004) 
 
Corruption Experience -0.058 
(0.495) 
 
Wish to work in private or public sector -0.164 
(0.262) 
 
Nationality 1.595*** 
(0.507) 
 
Constant -2.256** 
(0.932) 
 
Observations 115  
Pseudo R2 0.0887  
Prob > chi2 0.0806  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE A4, PUNISHMENT OF BRIBE: TOTAL SAMPLE 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Bribe 
(1)  
Gender -0.035 
(0.752) 
 
Religion 0.152 
(0.106) 
 
Field of Study 0.105** 
(0.048) 
 
Work Experience 0.424 
(0.639) 
 
Time spent in other countries -0.004 
(0.005) 
 
Corruption Experience -0.495 
(0.773) 
 
Wish to work in private or public sector -0.112 
(0.409) 
 
Nationality -1.915** 
(0.836) 
 
Constant 2.128 
(1.681) 
 
Observations 65  
Pseudo R2 0.159  
Prob > chi2 0.077  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
TABLE A5, AMOUNT OF PUNISHMENT: TOTAL SAMPLE 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Bribe 
(1)  
Gender -4.145* 
(2.176) 
 
Religion -0.532 
(0.314) 
 
Field of Study -0.001 
(0.090) 
 
Work Experience 2.142 
(1.901) 
 
Time spent in other countries -0.020 
(0.021) 
 
Corruption Experience 1.802 
(2.556) 
 
Wish to work in private or public sector -1.527 
(1.036) 
 
Nationality 1.559 
(2.197) 
 
Constant 12.52** 
(4.574) 
 
Observations 38  
Prob > F   0.229  
R-squared 0.281  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Experiments: 
Please fill out the following document: 
Code Number:____ 
□ FIRM    □ OFFICIAL   □ CITIZEN 
1. Age: ___years 
2. Gender:  □ FEMALE     □ MALE 
3. Field of Study: _______________________________ 
4. Semester: ____ 
5. Work Experience: □ YES     □ NO 
If yes, where and how long (in months):____________________________ 
6. Religion: □ JEWISH  □ CATHOLIC    □ PROTESTANT  □ ISLAM    □ HINDU □ ATHEIST  □ Other__________  □ 
None 
7. Income:_______ 
8. Time spent in other countries (months):_______________________ 
9. Reasons for your behavior: 
FIRM 
Bribe? 
IF, YES: □ PAYOFF MAXIMATION   □ FOR THE SOCIAL / ECONOMIC GOOD OF THE COUNTRY (e.g. reduce 
unemployment etc.)    
□ TO SEE THE RESPONSE OF THE OFFICIAL / CITIZEN   
□ OTHER REASONS_____________________  
IF, NO: □ MORALITY    □ TO REDUCE CORRUPTION (SOCIAL COST)   □ PROFIT-MAXIMISATION (IN THE 
LONG RUN IT IS BAD FOR THE FIRM) □ NOT NECESSARY FOR FIRMS TO BRIBE □ EQUITY 
□ OTHER REASONS_____________________  
 
OFFICIAL 
ACCEPT? 
IF, YES: □ NECESSARY FOR FIRMS TO BRIBE / WILL BE ABLE TO HELP THE FIRM    □ NECESSARY BECAUSE 
SALARIES ARE LOW  □ PAYOFF MAXIMATION  □ EQUITY □ GAME WILL CONTINUE 
□ OTHER REASONS_____________________  
IF, NO: □ MORALITY    □ TO REDUCE CORRUPTION (SOCIAL COST)   □ SCARED OF IMPLICATIONS / RISK 
□ PAYOFF MAXIMISATION  □ FAIRNESS □ BRIBE TOO SMALL 
□ OTHER REASONS_____________________  
 
CITIZEN 
PUNISH? 
IF, YES: □ MORALITY □ REDUCE CORRUPTION □ FAIRNESS □ NEGATIVE RECIPROCITY 
□ OTHER REASONS_____________________  
IF, NO: □ PAYOFF MAXIMISATION    □ DIFFICULT TO CHANGE THE SYSTEM □ INEFFECTIVE PUNISH-
MENT SYSTEM   
□ BRIBE MAY BE FOR A GOOD PURPOSE OR MAY BE NECESSARY   □ OTHER REA-
SONS_____________________  
 
10. After graduating do you wish to work in the private or public sector? 
  24 
□ PRIVATE SECTOR     □ PUBLIC SECTOR   □ DON’T KNOW 
11. Hear about or come in contact with corruption? 
 □ PERSONALLY IN YOUR WORKPLACE    □ PERSONALLY AT UNIVERSITY    □ VIA FRIENDS / FAMILY  
□ VIA MASS MEDIA (TV, NEWSPAPER, RADIO)   □ NO CONTACT   
If, Yes: Example:_____________________________________________________________________ 
Thank you very much!!! 
 
